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Who lost Italy? 
Daniel Gros 
he EU seems to have lost Italy. The majority of the population today has a negative 
opinion of the EU, representing a complete reversal since the start of the euro, when the 
country viewed the new currency as a welcome corrective to its own economic problems 
of high inflation (and high interest rates). This stark shift in public opinion constitutes the root 
cause of the present turbulence in the financial markets. From an economic point of view, there 
would be no cause for concern. There has been much talk about the need for (further) 
structural reform in Italy. In reality, however, even a government that did not do anything 
would not necessarily portend a catastrophe, but just a continuation of the present trend of 
moderate growth and deficits leading to a slow reduction in the public debt burden.  
Today’s crisis is thus entirely political. It was triggered by the circulation of some vague ideas in 
both major populist parties about exiting the euro. Introducing a new currency is not on the 
official programme of any major party, but enough of their leaders have hinted that they might 
consider this step, even if only as a plan B, for financial markets to factor into their calculations 
of the terms under which the Italian government can obtain credit. It is only natural that anyone 
lending funds in euro to an Italian entity includes a risk premium for the possibility that a new 
Italian government might one day declare that it will reimburse its debt in a new, and 
presumably much weaker currency. Given that exiting the euro would affect all Italian 
residents, it is natural that the risk premium also applies immediately to Italian banks and 
corporates seeking to refinance themselves abroad. This is thus not only a public debt crisis. 
How did the ‘Europhobia’ come about? 
Populist politicians charge that the rules of the Growth and Stability Pact do not allow them to 
stimulate demand and employment. And many economists would agree that the ‘austerity’ 
imposed on crisis countries in the past aggravated the recession. But this does not add up to a 
convincing argument that euro area membership was somehow responsible for Italy’s 
economic underperformance. 
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Spain, Portugal and Ireland, which also had to reduce their deficits in trying times, are 
recovering much more strongly than Italy. Moreover, over the last few years, Italy has been 
granted a number of exceptions from the fiscal rules, allowing it to actually slightly increase the 
deficit, if one calculates the impact of the economic cycle. In almost every one of the last 20 
years, Italy has grown less than the rest of the euro area while being allowed to run a fiscal 
deficit which almost every year was higher than in other member states (see Figures 1 and 2 
below.) Thus, one cannot argue that Italy is still growing much less than the rest of Europe 
because the country is not allowed to run even larger deficits. 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth Figure 2. Government deficit (as % of GDP) 
  
Source: Ameco database. 
To what phenomenon then can we attribute Italy’s slow growth since the turn of the century? 
If one looks carefully at the main growth factors like investment, education and indicators of 
market liberalisation, one finds that over the last 20 years Italy has actually partially closed the 
gap relative to its European peers in all of these fields. Thus, one cannot explain the 
underperformance with these standard variables. There is only one area in which Italy’s relative 
performance has deteriorated since 1999-2000, namely the quality of the country’s 
governance. As shown already in Gros (2011), Italy’s corruption and governance problems are 
longstanding, but they have unfortunately deteriorated severely since the start of EMU. 
Moreover, domestic governance problems become an increasingly important handicap in an 
increasingly interconnected world. 
The deleterious impact of corruption and pervasive conflicts of interest on growth, and 
economic performance in general, is diffuse and difficult to pinpoint. It is thus understandable 
that the euro has become a scapegoat: It is psychologically very difficult to accept that a long 
period of economic underperformance has its roots mainly in the deterioration of the domestic 
political institutions. But this scapegoating constitutes an obstacle to deep reforms. 
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The countries that have recovered quickest from the crisis are those, like Ireland, Spain and 
Portugal where the narrative ‘it is all the fault of the euro’ has not taken hold. By contrast, the 
two countries where this narrative has become prevalent, Italy and Greece, are the same two 
countries where the recovery has been hesitant and partial. 
The root causes of the current crisis are thus domestic; they have little to do with fiscal rules or 
a lack of risk sharing. This means that the crisis needs to be resolved domestically. Italy’s 
partners and the EU institutions must accept this and resist the temptation to intervene in the 
domestic debate. 
